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In his recent examination of The Discourse o f Musicology Giles Hooper 
poses the question ‘What should one say about music?’ and it is clear 
that the use of the word should here covers a moral dimension.1 Unlike, 
say, physicians and engineers, whose activities are assessed in terms of 
outcomes such as health of patients and robustness of physical 
constructions, what musicologists do must primarily be considered in 
terms of the words they produce. Given that this is the case, and that 
speech acts (understood to cover inscriptions -  the normal mode of 
scholarly discourse - as well as utterances) may be examined for 
whether they are true or false, appropriately informative or deceptive, 
perspicuous or vague, questions of truth, honesty, and intellectual 
integrity, can become important issues for musicologists.
In the course of the twentieth century, the ‘hard sciences’ 
demonstrated dramatic success in the discovery of truths and in 
applications, both benign and otherwise, in medicine, information 
management, space exploration, and warfare. As a result, such sciences 
seemed to provide a model for any field of enquiry with pretensions to 
intellectual respectability. This is the background to Joseph Kerman’s 
assessment of the state of musicology in the early 1980s.2 According to 
Kerman, musicology then was ‘perceived as dealing essentially with the 
factual, the documentary, the verifiable, the analysable, the 
positivistic’.3 Two terms in that statement, verifiable and positivistic, 
invoke a philosophy of science, positivism, which had arisen in the early 
part of the centuiy in Germany among the so-called Vienna Circle, a 
view that is now largely seen as discredited. This philosophy amounted
1 G iles H ooper, The Discourse o f Musicology (A ldershot: A sh ga te , 2006), p .i.
2 J o se p h  K erm an , Musicology (L ondon : F o n tan a  Press, 1985).
s Ibid .. p .12.
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to a Procrustean distortion of science to accommodate a philosophically 
misconceived conception of the way scientists actually operated.^
Postmodernism, in reaction to the weight accorded by some, to 
factual verifiability, substituted an emphasis on ‘indeterminacy and 
interpretive “play"'. < Such a substitution raises significant issues for any 
discipline. In this regard, Felipe Fernandez-Armesto writes of his fears 
that the post-modern challenge would subvert historians’ traditional 
aspirations to the truth and he attributes to librarians in recent decades 
a worry that in the future they would be consigning history books to the 
fiction shelves.6 Musicologists would seem to be vulnerable to a similar 
risk. The worry is that, convinced of the impossibility of attaining truth, 
they would, faute de mieux, resort to fictional narrative as the only 
appropriate musicological mode of discourse.
And, perhaps, a preference for the relaxed attitude of the fiction 
writer over the conscientious stance of the scholar is understandable. 
The allure of fiction is not confined just to readers; Amos Oz tells us 
how he was envied by his scholar father for the freedom that he enjoyed:
H e alw ays en vied  m e m y n ovelist’s freedom  to w rite  as I w ish , 
u n co n fin ed  b y  all kin ds o f  p re lim in a ry  search an d  research , 
u n b u rd en ed  b y  the o b ligation  to  acq u ain t m y se lf w ith all existin g  data 
in the fie ld , un h arn essed  from  the yo ke  o f  com p arin g sources, 
p ro vid in g  evid en ce, ch eckin g q uotation s and in stalling fo otn otes: free 
as a  b ird .7
Frankfurt on Truth
The scholar, unlike the novelist, must stay rooted in reality. A 
significant common theme of Harry G. Frankfurt’s two recent essays On
4 See en tries u n d er ‘lo g ica l p o sitiv ism ’ and the v erifia b ility  criterion  o f  m ean in g ’ 
p. 514, and ‘V ien n a  C irc le ’ p. 956, in R obert A udi (ed.), The Cambridge 
Dictionary o f  Philosophy  (C am bridge: C am brid ge U n iversity  Press, 1999).
5 H ooper, The D iscourse o f  M usicology, p. 35.
6 F elip e F ern an d ez-A rm esto , ‘E pilogue: W h at is H isto ry  N ow ?, in W hat Is 
H istory N ow ?, ed. b y  D avid  C an n adin e (London: P algrave M acm illan , 2 002), p. 
149.
7 A m o s O z, The Story Begins: Essays on Literature (O rlando: H arcou rt Brace & 
com p an y, 1999), p .i.
xiv
Kehoe
Truth and On Bullshit is the importance (and against all kinds of 
postmodernists, relativists, and sceptics, the possibility) of ‘attending to 
the way things are’.8 Frankfurt contends that objective truth is a 
coherent concept, and that it is an important element in both practical 
and theoretical thinking. He further contends that currently fashionable 
theories of relativism and postmodernism are inimical to humane living 
and are, in any event, self-refuting.9 Noting that publicists and 
politicians typically display a relaxed attitude towards truth, Frankfurt 
is disturbed that such an attitude is now apparent among those, 
including academics, who might ‘reasonably have been counted on to 
know better’.10 Such persons:
em p h atica lly  d ism iss a p resu m p tio n  th at is n ot o n ly  u tterly  
fu n d am en ta l to respon sib le  in q u iry  and  th ought, but that w ou ld  seem  
to b e  -  on the face o f  it -  e n tire ly  in nocuou s: th e  p resu m p tio n  th at 
“w h at the facts a re” is a usefu l n otion , or that it is, at the ve ry  least, a 
n otion  w ith  in te llig ib le  m e a n in g .11
In this essay I propose to examine several examples of musicology 
under the Frankfurtian rubric of ‘attending to the way things are’. How 
do musicologists attend to the way things are, and what could the 
notion of so attending, understood as an obligation, mean for the 
practice of musicology?
8 llarryG. Frankfurt, On Bullshit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 
On Truth (London: Pimlico, 20 0 6 ). The quotation is from the earlier essay:'[...) 
a person’s normal habit of attending to the way things are may become 
attenuated or lost [by excessive indulgence in the habit of bullshitting]’, p. 60.
“ ‘In any case, even those who profess to deny tiie validity or the objective reality 
of the true-false distinction continue to maintain without apparent 
embarrassment that this denial is a position that they do truh/ endorse. The 
statement that they reject the distinction between true and false is, they insist, 
an unqualifiedly true statement about their beliefs, not a false one.’ (italics in 
original) Frankfurt, On Truth, pp. 8-y. Similar considerations are proposed by 
Thomas Nagel in The Ia is I Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.6 .  
For a philosophical defence of the idea of objective truth against various forms 
of ‘veriphobia’ (that is challenges to the idea of objective truth), see Alvin I.
Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999),
Chapter One, pp. 3-40.
10 F ran kfurt, On Truth, p .18.
11 F ran kfu rt, On Truth, p .19.
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In tr o d u c tio n  
Gibbs on Schubert
My first example raises the fundamental question of whether there is, 
objectively, a ‘way things are’ which could make sense of the notion of 
an obligation to focus on the way things are. A flirtation with 
postmodernism, and an apparent conflation of objective fact with 
invented fiction, can be seen in the treatment by Christopher Gibbs of 
Schubert reception in his essay “‘Poor Schubert”: Images and Legends 
of the Composer’.12 In discussing the reliability of the legends 
surrounding the life of the composer, Gibbs warns against discounting 
“the aesthetic truth’ of certain fictions’.^ By way of explanation of this 
idea he states that anecdotes often arise from, and reflect the need to, 
create a legend in the first place.
While the contention that present concerns may lead to the 
creation of legends about the past may be true, the terminology used 
here is surely confusing. One might, in the context of a work of fiction, 
use the notion of ‘aesthetic truth’, for example, to claim that a character 
created by the author was a convincing figure that might well be 
encountered in real life. However, in the case of the portrayal of a 
historical character, this notion seems particularly inappropriate. The 
historian or biographer does not have the same latitude as the 
practitioner of creative fiction.h While it is necessary to recognize the 
difficulties in reaching the truth, there is no reason to believe that it is in 
principle impossible to reach, at least, some part of the truth. The 
human proneness to error is a reason for us to be cautious in the search 
for truth; a reason for us to be ready to scrutinize, and if necessary 
revise, our beliefs, in the light of new evidence; but it is no reason for 
the abandonment of that search.^
Christopher H. Gibbs, ‘“ Poor Schubert”: Images and Legends o f the 
C om poser’ , in The Cam bridge Companion to Schubert, ed. by Christopher H. 
Gibbs (Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1997), pp. 36 -  55. Hereafter 
referred to as Gibbs, “Poor Schubert”.
'3 Gibbs, “Poor Schubert”, p.39
11 Frankfurt points out that ‘There are important limits |...| concerning the 
range o f  variation in interpreting the facts that serious historians |...| may be 
expected to display.' Frankfurt, On Truth, p. 26.
ir> 'At most, recognizing that our history has been shaped by many stories that 
we now regard as false must make us cautious, and always ready to call into 
question the very stories that we now hold as true, since the criterion o f wisdom
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Gibbs ends his discussion of Schubert on a thoroughly sceptical 
note. He suggests that the truth is elusive and that we are in thrall to 
images which may not reflect the reality of the composer’s life. 
Significantly, he raises the possibility that scholarly discussion produces 
as many distorted images as supposedly less reliable sources of truth 
such as pictures, popular biographies, or operetta.16 If Gibbs is 
proposing a position of universal scepticism the degree of pessimism is 
unwarranted, as it would seem to call in question the veiy enterprise of 
objective music scholarship. Such scholarship can aim at the objective 
truth, while at the same time recognising the difficulty of attaining it.
Our attitude to the world of fiction has to be different to our 
attitude to the real world. No matter how interesting, engaging, or 
lifelike, fictional characters cannot engender moral demands to which 
we must pay heed: their interests cannot be advanced by any of our 
actions; their rights cannot be vindicated by any of our interventions; 
nor can we do anything to relieve any burdens that they may bear. 
Fictional events are similarly insulated from any of our moral concerns: 
nothing that happens in a fictional world can oblige us to act in a certain 
way or adopt a certain policy.v However, the real world, which is the 
domain of the scholar, does make moral demands on us, and in order to 
satisfy these demands we must attend to the way things are in that 
world.18
o f the com m unity is based on constant wariness about the fallibility o f our 
knowledge.’ Um berto Eco, On Literature (N ew York: Harcourt, 2004), p. 299.
16 Gibbs, “Poor Schubert”, p. 55.
‘7 This is not to deny that fictional works can help to m ake us more m orally 
sensitive and aware. See Martha Nussbaum , Poetic Justice: The Literary  
Im agination and Public Life  (Boston, Beacon Press, 1995), and Katherine Elgin, 
Considered Judgm ent (Princeton, N ew Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1996), pp. 1 7 9 -9 6 .
18 The way tilings 'are' should, obviously, be interpreted to include historical 
realities. The realities o f the past can create moral obligations. For example, we 
m ay have duties to dead persons, including dead com posers. See Peter Kivy, The 
Fine Art o f  Repetition: Essays in the Philosophy o f  M usic  (Cambridge: 
Cam bridge University Press, 1993), Chapter V, 'Live perform ances and dead 
com posers: O n the ethics o f musical interpretation’, pp. 95-116. For the notion 
o f posthum ous harm See Thom as Nagel, M ortal Questions (Cambridge: 
Cam bridge University Press, 1979), Chapter 1, 'D eath’, pp. 1-10, and Joel 
Feinberg, Harm to Others: The M oral Lim its o f  the Crim inal Law  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 80-86.
Shelemay and the Case of the Beta Israel
Such demands were clearly apparent to Kay Kaufman Shelemay once 
she began to reflect on her research project. During the 1970s Shelemay 
studied the liturgical chant of the Beta Israel or Falasha, an ethnic group 
from north-western Ethiopia."» From the late nineteenth century, due to 
outside influence, this group began to see themselves not merely as a 
religious minority in the country of their birth, but as co-religionists 
with the Jews, and the perception of their own identity changed 
accordingly. Following a campaign to ensure their acknowledgment as 
Jews, the rabbinic authorities in Israel gave the group full recognition, 
with consequential rights of entry to, and citizenship of, that state. 
However, the research carried out by Shelemay cast doubt on any 
connection between the liturgical music of the group and a supposed 
ancient Jewish origin, and showed, to the contrary, that the church 
music of the group bore marked similarities to extant Christian 
Ethiopian music.
These findings could have harmed the interests of the subject 
group, whose sense of identity had been shaped around a presumed 
Jewish lineage and whose material interests were served by a right of 
entry to Israel as a means of escape from their own war-torn homeland. 
This posed an ethical dilemma for the researcher: whether to publish 
her findings, thus serving the interests of scholarship, and indeed her 
own interest as a musicologist who had invested significant time and 
energy in the project; or to keep confidential the outcome of her 
research in the interests of the subject group who had extended her 
their cooperation.
After considering her options, she decided to restrict her 
findings to scholarly publications, and to steer clear of publicity that 
might compromise the position of members of the ethnic group at the 
centre of her study.20 One may query the efficacy of these actions. The 
world of academic writing is not somehow hermetically sealed off from 
the world of politics, and there is no guarantee that something written 
in a scholarly journal will not be given a wider circulation.
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"» Kay Kaufm an Shelemay, ‘The Impact and Ethics o f Musical Scholarship’, in 
R ethinking M usic, ed. by Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist (Oxford: Oxford 
U niversity Press, 1999), pp. 531-44.
20 Shelem ay, ‘The Im pact and Ethics o f Musical Scholarship’, p. 542.
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Whatever reservations might be had about the way that 
Shelemay dealt with her problem, that problem was at least partially 
defined by a concern for, and a specific understanding of the nature of, 
truth. The most plausible explanation of her attitude to her research is 
that she takes seriously the notion of truth as something that should 
constrain what she may appropriately do and say. We can infer from her 
report that for her truth is ‘out there’, something to be discovered, 
something that obtains irrespective of her view or her interests, or the 
shared opinion of any community or collective to which she might 
belong. For those who think like Shelemay, truth is ‘o f  the world, rather 
than ‘for’ the individual inquirer or community. Consequently she feels 
obliged to attend to the way things are in a real world which exists 
independently of her research or of the views or thoughts of others.
Eric Werner on Mendelssohn
The issue of how musicologists do not have the freedom of the writer of 
creative fiction, and how they must be constrained by the relevant 
historical evidence, is poignantly raised in Jeffrey Sposato’s 
examination of Eric Werner’s writings on Mendelssohn.21 Werner 
(1901-1988), a German musicologist who fled to America in 1938 to 
escape the Nazi regime, portrayed the composer as someone who had, 
despite superficial assimilation into German society, retained a 
conception of himself as essentially Jewish.
Sposato believes that the common post-war depiction of 
Mendelssohn -  shared by Werner and others - as ‘a man with a passion 
for his [Jewish] heritage [which] was strengthened by the severe 
episodes of oppression that he faced throughout his life’ is little more 
than ‘creative writing’.22 He links this to the shadow of the Nuremberg 
laws which provided an unambiguous and inescapable categorization 
for Jews. Such laws did not recognize assimilation. Compensating for 
the denigration of Mendelssohn, who was effectively expunged from 
music history by Nazi musicologists, and converting the Nazi ‘badge of
21 Jeffrey S. Sposato, ‘Creative W riting: The [Self-] Identification of 
M endelssohn as Jew ’, The M usical Quarterly, 82/1, (1998), 190-209. I am 
grateful to Dr Lorraine Byrne Bodley for bringing W erner’s treatm ent of 
M endelssohn to my attention.
22 Sposato, ‘Creative W riting’, p. 204.
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shame’ to a badge of honour, the composer was now seen as essentially 
Jewish.2s
Sposato demonstrates that Werner was, to say the least, 
wayward in the manner in which he argued his case. To portray the 
composer as a victim in a hostile anti-Semitic environment Werner cites 
actual instances of insulting behaviour but exaggerates the degree of 
virulence involved.24 He also imputes anti-Semitic motivation to the 
decision not to make Mendelssohn Director of the Berlin Singakademie, 
where this decision could quite plausibly be explained by other factors, 
such as the composer’s youth and lack o f experience compared to the 
appointee.2»
However, the clearest example of bias is Werner’s translation, 
from the German, of a let ter written in London by the composer in July 
1833 commenting on the Jewish Civil Disabilities Bill which had just 
passed the House of Commons (as in the case of the Catholic Relief Act 
passed four years previously, this was an ameliorative measure, 
benefiting the Jewish community in England by removing restrictions, 
including prohibitions on voting and on entry to public office). Sposato 
shows how this translation omits parts of the text of the original and 
interpolates elements not found in Mendelssohn’s letter.2» The 
omissions and interpolations are quite clearly intended to show the 
composer as emotionally involved in the event because of his self- 
identification as a Jew. A strict translation and analysis of the letter 
shows that Mendelssohn viewed the passing of the bill with cool 
detachment; there was ‘no expression of Jewish pride, but rather 
amusement at the irony that five days after the Prussian government 
should issue an edict restricting the rights of Jews, the English 
Government should emancipate them’.2?
There is something clearly wrong with the manner in which 
Werner dealt with the historical reality to which he should have been 
attending. Either carelessly or (which is more likely) deliberately, he 
misrepresented the facts of the matter. Werner’s treatment of the
Introduction
23 Sposato, ‘Creative W riting’, p. 192.
24 Sposato, ‘Creative W riting’, pp. 193-94.
23 Ibid., pp. 192-93.
26 Sposato, ‘Creative W riting’, pp. 194-204.
2? Sposato, ‘Creative W riting’, p. 200.
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Mendelssohn question certainly represents a complete abandonment of 
proper standards of scholarship.28
It is relevant here to mention what philosopher Susan Haack 
has written about scholarly inquiry. Haack takes it as a tautology that 
inquiry aims at the truth.29 She contrasts ‘genuine inquiry’, carried out 
by those with intellectual integrity, with ‘pseudo inquiry’ which is 
motivated, not by a desire to arrive at the truth whatever that is, but to 
make a persuasive case for some proposition which is determined in 
advance of any careful scrutiny of evidence. ’ 3 °
By distorting the evidence Werner neglects attending to the way 
things are. However, there are other ways in which scholars do not pay 
appropriate attention to reality. By taking a narrow disciplinary view, 
salient facts, which arguably should not be ignored, may be left out of 
consideration.
As pointed out by Stephen Toulmin, historically, the 
development of disciplines necessitated a deliberate narrowing of the 
field of enquiry of their practitioners. The ensuing intellectual division 
of labour, which obliged those in a specific discipline ‘to focus 
e x c lu s iv e ly  on the things they knew best and did best’, resulted in a 
blinkered view.31 As part of this historical process, abstract concepts, 
appropriate to each field of inquiry, were developed. While these 
concepts facilitated the achievement of certainty in specific disciplines, 
their use involved, in effect, a cultivated and deliberate shutting off from
28 In an editorial com m ent on the Sposato article, Leon Botstein accepts that 
what W erner did was ‘crim inal’ (214). However he also warns against assum ing 
an attitude o f moral superiority (215). In the context where scholarship had 
been recruited to the service o f Nazi ideology, and anti-Sem itism  had been given 
a pseudo-scientific gloss (214), he points out that W erner and other émigré 
intellectuals ‘never experienced anything approxim ating “norm alcy”’ (218). 
Leon Botstein, ‘M endelssohn and the Jew s’, The M usical Quarterly, Vol. 82, 
No. 1, (Spring, 1998), 210-219.
2CJ Susan Haack, M anifesto o f  a Passionate M oderate: Unfashionable Essays 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998) p. 189.
3° Susan Haack, M anifesto o f  a Passionate M oderate, p. 189. See also 
Frankfurt: '1... | higher levels o f civilization must depend I... I on a conscientious 
respect for the im portance o f honesty and clarity in reporting the facts, and on a 
stubborn concern for accuracy in determ ining what the facts are.’ On Truth, 
p. 16. For Frankfurt, a lack o f deference or respect for the truth is facilitated by 
current views such as postm odernism  and relativism. On Truth, pp. 17-20.
81 Stephen Toulm in, Return to Reason, (Cam bridge, M assachusetts: Harvard 
U niversity Press, 2001) p. 41.
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view, aspects of reality deemed to be outside the proper area of 
c o n c e r n .32 The adoption of a narrow perspective also excluded questions 
of e t h i c s . 33 Taken to extremes, this tendency could relieve the scholar of 
any obligation of attending to the realities outside his own ivory tower. 
In this connection Northrop Frye sums up a widely held view of 
academics in the following way:
the disinterested pursuit o f knowledge acquires, for its very virtues, the 
reputation o f being unrelated to social realities. The intellectual, it is 
thought, lives in an over-sim plified Euclidean world; his attitude to 
society is at best aloof, at worst irresponsible; his loyalties and 
enm ities, when they exist, have the naive ferocity o f abstraction, a 
system atic preference o f logical extremes to practical m e a n s .34
A desire to escape the restraints of a specific scholarly discipline, as 
such constraints are conceived at any particular time, need not be the 
same as a desire to retire to the world of fiction, and neither need it 
represent an unprincipled abandonment of all responsibilities. Indeed 
the opposite may be the case: dissatisfaction with the perceived limits of 
a discipline such as musicology may be an assumption of responsibility.
In his paper M u sic o lo g y  a n d /a s S o c ia l C o n cern : Im a g in in g  the 
R e le v a n t  M u s ic o lo g is t35 Ralph P. Locke reports on various fears raised 
on the electronic discussion list of the American Musicological Society 
about the social relevance of the discipline. Amongst these qualms is a 
worry about how musicology might ‘help to draw attention to or even in 
some way alleviate one or another of the many seemingly intractable
32 Toulm in, Return to Reason, p. 147.
33 Ibid., p. 45.
3,1 Northrop Frye, ‘The Knowledge o f Good and Evil', in The M orality o f  
Scholarship, ed. by Max Black (New York: Cornell University Press, 1967). p. 9. 
See also Ogden Nash's verse, The Purist, which nicely lam poons a type of 
disengaged objectivity: 1 give you now Professor Twist,/ A conscientious 
scientist./ Trustees exclaim ed, "He never bungles!”/ And sent him o ff to distant 
jungles./ Cam ped on a tropic riverside,/ One day he missed his loving bride./ 
She had, the guide informed him later,/ Been eaten by an alligator./ Professor 
Tw ist could not hut sm ile./ "You m ean,” he said, “a crocodile". Ogden Nash, 
Candy is Dundy: The llest oJ'Ogden Nash (Guildford: Methuen, 1983), p. (45.
■'•5 Ralph P. Locke, 'M usicology and/as Social Concern: Im agining the Relevant 
M usicologist’, Rethinking M usic, ed. b y  Nicholas Cook and M ark Everist 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 499.
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national and world problems’. Such unease is surely misconceived: the 
activities of musicologists, as such, would seem to offer little in the way 
of remedies for the relevant evils. However, that is not to say that it is 
always appropriate for a musicologist to take a narrow disciplinary view.
Feld on Schizophonic mimesis
When music, regarded purely as sound structured in a specific way, is 
perceived as a disembodied reality, the ramifications, in the wider 
human context, of musical composition, performance, analysis, and 
scholarship may remain unacknowledged. Such disciplinary inattention 
may be a productive stance, but it may also be inappropriate, and a 
denial of responsibility. In his paper Pygmy Pop. A Genealogy o f  
Schizophonic Mimesis Steven Feld does not hesitate to engage with 
moral considerations^ Feld’s examination of particular commercial 
practices should be seen in the context of the structural economic 
differences which exist in today’s globalized world, with intellectual 
property laws shaped by the most powerful actors on the world stage, 
and with some multi-national companies almost on a par with, or more 
powerful than, some sovereign states.37
Feld has coined the term schizophonic mimesis to describe the 
practice whereby, by means of sound recording, music is torn from its 
cultural context and put to uses not envisaged by its creators.88 In this 
regard he instances the use of the music of the Ba-Benzele pygmy tribe 
of the Central African Republic, which has found its way, via Herbie 
Hancock’s Watermelon Man, into the Sanctuary track of the Madonna 
CD Bedtime Stories.39
Feld refers to a 1970 interview in which Chicago-born Hancock, 
replying to a question on whether he had ever been to Africa, responds, 
‘Naw. Africa is where I am. Africa is here’A0 By so responding, Hancock
36 Steven Feld, ‘Pygmy POP. A  Genealogy o f Schizophonic M im esis’, Yearbook 
f o r  Traditional M usic, 28 (1996), 1-35. H ereafter referred to as Feld, ‘Pygmy 
POP'.
37 Manfred B. Sieger, Globalization: A Very Short Introduction  (Oxford: Oxford 
U niversity Press, 2003) pp. 48-51. The W orld Trade Organization TRIPS 
Agreem ent o f 1994 on intellectual property rights has been described as ‘llie 
m ost effective vehicle o f W estern imperialism in history-. Marci A Hamilton, 
‘The TRIPS Agreem ent: Im perialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective', p. 243.
3® Feld, ‘Pygm y POP, p. 13.
39 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
4° Ibid., p. 8.
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seems to be assuming a generic ‘African’ identity, distinct from the 
specific national identity he gained by virtue of his birth, and also 
distinct from the specific ethnic identity of the tribe whose music he had 
appropriated. Such thinking seems to provide a basis for the 
appropriation of the music in question by reference to the reciprocal 
give-and-take relationships characteristic of families (for Hancock the 
use of the music was a ‘brothers kind o f  thing’).-*' H o w ever, as pointed 
out by Feld, such rhetoric, made more acceptable by viewing the
schizophonic practices as ‘purely musical forms of encounter*, masks
the asymmetric power and economic differences which characterize the 
relationships between the Western music industry and Western 
musicians, the takers, on the one hand; and the peoples whose music is 
appropriated, those taken-from (not givers) on the other.42
Feld suggests that the ethnomusicologists who first researched 
the music for academic purposes must take some responsibility for the 
use and abuse which their initiatives have facilitated:
Ethnom usicologists and anthropologists could once claim innocence 
about the activities of recording and m arketing what was variously
called tribal, ethnic, folk, or traditional music. Now there is little doubt
that this whole body o f work, since the time o f the invention o f the 
phonograph, has been central to com plex representations and 
com m odity flows that are neither ideologically neutral, unfailingly 
positive, or particularly equitable.«
The hindewhu music which was used by Hancock and Madonna is 
characterised by alternation between multi-pitched vocal sounds and 
single pitched sounds produced by the vocalist on a papaya stem 
w histle.44 Feld deplores the ‘caricature’ of the original music contained 
in ‘pygmy pop’ such as the Madonna track, and the richness and 
sophistication of the music which is referenced:
41 Feld, ‘Pygm y PO P’, p. 6.
4= Ibid., pp. 15, 23.
43 Ibid., p. 13.
44 Ibid.,p. 22.
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The docum entary records em phasize a vast repertory o f musical forms 
and perform ance styles, including com plex and original polyphonic 
and polyrhythm ic practices. Yet what o f this diverse musical invention 
form s the basis for its global pop representation? In the m ost popular 
instances it is a singly untexted vocalization or falsetto yodel, often 
hunting cries rather than songs or m usical pieces. This is the sonic 
cartoon of the dim inutive person, the simple, intuitively vocal and 
essentially non-linguistic child .«
Although some of the commercial organizations which had profited 
from the use of the music indicated a concern for the peoples whose 
music was being used, and expressed an intention to assign funds for 
the benefit of the peoples in question, Feld’s inquiries seemed to suggest 
that this was merely lip service, and that the implicit promise was not, 
in fact, honoured.46
Differences between the developed and underdeveloped 
economies cast a shadow even on the world of academia. And 
scholarship can be commandeered for ideological purposes in the 
maintenance of such differences. In a paper written some forty years 
ago, Conor Cruise O’Brien remarked on how the agenda of some 
Western scholars seemed to be subordinated to the requirements of 
global capitalism and how at least some works of scholarship 
manifested a ‘consistently selective myopia’ which rendered invisible 
how Western capitalist domination worked against the interests of 
populations in Asia and Africa.47 It is not at all clear that the situation 
has changed radically over the four decades since O’Brien produced his 
analysis. In this context it is interesting to see that Feld has not ignored 
the relevant issues and has adverted to global economic and power 
disparities, and has drawn out the relevance of this for the practice of 
musicology.
Taruskin and Fink on The Death o f  Klinghojfer
Global realities also form the backdrop to a controversy which is the 
subject of my next example. At times of perceived national crisis, a
45 Feld, ‘Pygm y POP’, pp. 26-27.
46 Ibid., p. 26.
47 Conor Cruise O'Brien, ‘Politics and the M orality o f Scholarship’, in The 
M orality o f  Scholarship, ed. by M ax Black (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1967), PP- 5 9 - 7 4  (p. 72).
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collective ‘groupthink’ may emerge which pervades even the realm of 
scholarship. Al such times the values of disinterested inquiry, 
objectivity, and a sole concern for truth may be seen by some, including 
some members o f the scholarly Community, as luxuries which cannot be 
afforded until the emergency is resolved. And of course, in the case of a 
crisis such as the ‘War on Terror’, a resolution may be assumed not to 
be achievable in the foreseeable future.
Questions of attention and inattention arise in the conflicting 
responses of two musicologists, Richard Tamskin and Robert Fink, to 
the opera The Death o f Klinghoffer by John Adams (libretto by Alice 
Goodman).-»8 The former emphasizes the necessity, as he saw it, to 
‘focus resolutely on the [terrorist] acts’ -i1J which constitute the historical 
context of the work, while the latter suggests that Taruskin was, in 
relation to the work, suffering from ‘critical deafness’. 1^
In an article published on 9 December 2001 in The New York 
Times,s» Taruskin commented favourably on the cancellation, by the 
Boston Symphony Orchestra, of a performance of excerpts from 
Klinghoffer. The opera, which was based on the 1985 hijacking of the 
cruise ship Achille Laura by Palestinian terrorists and the subsequent 
assassination o f one of the passengers, the Jewish wheelchair-bound 
Leon Klinghoffer, had attracted considerable negative publicity on 
account of what was seen hy some as its bias in favour of the Palestinian 
hijackers. Using as a hypothetical analogy the inappropriateness of 
‘shov[ing] Wagner in the faces of Holocaust survivors in Israel’,52
Introduction
>8 Richard Taruskin, 'M usic’s Dangers and the Case for Control’, The Neu> York 
Times, 9 Decem ber, 2001, <lm 1 '7  nvi ¡mos.com> [Accessed 26 July, 2008], 
Robert Fink, 'Klinghoffer in Brooklyn Heights’, Cam bridge Opera Journal, 
17/2(2005), 1 7 3 - 2 1 3 -
•>" This quotation from Taruskin's article is provided in Fink, 'K linghoffer in 
Brooklyn H eights’, p. 176, although it is not included in the article on the web.
Fink, K linghoffer  in Brooklyn Heights, p. 181.
Taruskin, ‘M usic’s Dangers and the Case for Control'.
A lm ost certainly Taruskin is here referring to the performance in Jerusalem, 
under conductor Daniel Barenboim, o f the Prelude from Tristan and Isolde on 7 
July 2001. This perform ance, which broke the convention banning live 
perform ances o f W agner's music in the state o f Israel, caused a storm of 
outrage. Barenboim makes a distinction between W agner’s anti-Semitism 
(‘m onstrous and despicable'), and W agner’s m usic (Daniel Barenboim and 
Edward Said, Parallels and Paradoxes: Explorations in Music and Society  
(London: Bloom sbury, 2002). pp. 79-110 and pp. 175-184). In any event, 
Taruskin ’s analogy is less than apposite: W agner was a rabid anti-Sem ite, and
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Taruskin contends that it is gratuitous to offend ‘people stunned by 
previously unimaginable horrors’ with works like the Adams o p e r a . 53
The ‘previously unimaginable horrors’ referred to are clearly the 
events of 11 September 2001, when A1 Qaeda terrorists caused the 
destruction of the World Trade Center in New York, with loss of life 
running into thousands. Taruskin refers to that event explicitly twice, 
and suggests that the opera manifests ‘reprehensible contempt for the 
real-life victims’ of the atrocity. He does not call for a ban on the work, 
but suggests that musicians, such as members of the Boston Symphony, 
act responsibly by refusing to perform it.54
Here we see a musicologist prepared to widen his perspective to 
include more than just the music itself. However this is achieved in a 
somewhat selective manner. The easy invocation of the ‘War on Terror’ 
is questionable^ the currency of that particular shibboleth has had the 
effect of drawing attention away from problematic realities. By using it 
Taruskin evokes a stark Manichean dichotomy between two global 
forces: on the one hand there are ‘civilized states’, who pursue 
legitimate wars with unfortunate but unintended, and therefore -  so the 
argument goes - morally permissible, ‘collateral damage’s6 involving 
citizens; on the other hand, there are terrorists whose actions in 
destroying life are abominable.
In a careful and detailed analysis of the opera, Robert Fink 
takes issue with Taruskin’s analysis. Rejecting the contention that the 
Jewish characters are demeaned, Fink suggests that this perception is 
based on a faulty interpretation of a scene, featuring the fictional Jewish 
family of the Rumors, which was included in the first performance of
the fact that his m usic was appropriated by the Nazis created painful 
associations for those who had survived the Nazi persecution. On the other 
hand there is no evidence o f anti-Seinitism  on the part o f Adam s or Goodman -  
the librettist was o f Jewish extraction -  and Taruskin cannot use the analogy in 
support o f his thesis o f anti-Sem itic bias, as that contention is the very point at 
issue. I am grateful to Dr M ark Fitzgerald for bringing this issue to my notice.
53 Taruskin, 'M usic’s D angers’.
54 Ib id .
55 In a quotation from  Taruskin’s article in Fink, ‘Klinghoffer  in Brooklyn 
Heights’, p. 176, there is explicit reference to the need to defeat terrorism. The 
paragraph in which this reference is m ade is om itted from  the edited web 
article.
s6 A  convenient euphem ism  which tends to veil the grisly realities o f modern 
warfare.
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the opera but subsequently deleted. According to Fink, the Rumors are 
‘admirably, engagingly funny and self-aware, in their own haimish 
[Yiddish for ‘homey’ or ‘folksy’] w a y ’ .57
Fink provides an alternative understanding of the contrast 
between the heroic (exemplified in the opera by the Palestinians) and 
the domestic (exemplified by the two Jewish families, the Rumors and 
the eponymous Klinghoffers). In effect Fink argues cogently that the 
distinction between the heroic and the domestic should not be 
identified with a distinction between the noble and the ignoble.68 And 
this stance is entirely plausible. In her examination of the topic, Lucy 
Hughes-Hallett reminds us of the problematic nature of heroism. 
Among the heroes included in her survey are Alcibiades (‘an arrogant 
libertine and a turncoat several times over’), El Cid (‘a predatory 
warlord’), Wallenstein (‘a profiteer’), and Drake (‘a pirate and a 
terrorist'). Clearly heroism is not to be equated with virtue or moral 
worth .59
Both critics deal with the music in the opera. Taruskin points 
out that ‘numinous’ tones (‘long, quiet drawn-out tones in the highest 
violin register’) accompany almost all of the utterances of the 
Palestinians; that this is a musical analogue to a halo in a painting; and 
that such musical representation is absent, apart from one instance 
after Klinghoffer’s death, in the case of music accompanying utterances 
of the victims.60 Rink suggests that ‘Taruskin’s critical deafness’ has left 
him unaware of similar characteristics in several scenes in which the 
same kind of numinous music accompanies statements by Jews: the soft 
lamentation in the Chorus of Exiled Palestinians in the Prologue; the 
tender moment in Act II where Leon Klinghoffer attempts to distract his
Introduction
57 Fink, ‘K linghoffer  in Brooklyn H eights’, p. 186.
58 Ibid., pp. 201-07.
59 Lucy Hughes-H allett, Heroes: Saviours, Traitors, and Supermen  (London: 
Fourth Estate, 2004), p. 3. For the relationship between notions o f heroism , the 
cult o f sacrificial death, and the rejection of W estern values, see Ian Buruma 
and Avishai M argalit, Occidentalism: A  Short History o f  Anti-W esternism  
(London: A tlantic Books, 2004), Chapter 3, ‘Heroes and M erchants’, pp. 49-73. 
Burum a and M argalit point out the contrast between the cult of sacrificial death, 
and the recognition, ‘as witnessed by seventeenth-century Dutch painting and 
English novels [that] the unexceptional everyday life has dignity too and should 
be nurtured, not scorned.’ p. 71.
60 Taruskin, ‘M usic’s Dangers’.
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wife from their terrible predicament; and Marilyn Klinghoffer’s lament 
in the final moments of the work.61
In the previous examples the realities which claimed attention 
were historical and biographical facts about composers, and the 
possible undesirable effects of scholarly activity on informants who 
provided evidence for ethnomusicologists; these realities were not 
purely musical; they did not primarily concern, in Kerman’s phrase, ‘the 
music itself.62 In the case of The Death o f Klinghoffer both Taruskin 
and Fink do deal with ‘the music itself. Can the idea of attending to the 
way things are apply to music (‘objects of delight’), seen in isolation 
from the social realities in which it is embedded?63 Frankfurt points out 
that evaluative judgments ‘must depend on [...] statements about 
facts’.6"* The delight of the listener is subjective, but the objects which 
cause the delight, the musical works, are outside the mind of the 
perceiver, and these works have objective features which render them 
insusceptible to a radically unconstrained subjective interpretative
61 Fink, ‘Klinghoffer in Brooklyn Heights, pp. 177-81. According to Fink (p. 181) 
‘a decade-long pattern o f journalistic reception’ had the effect o f  drawing 
Taruskin’s attention away from  the philo-Sem itic aspects o f the opera.
Kerman, Musicology, p. 18.
6a Kerman had insisted, against the narrow positivism that he saw as dominant 
at the lime, that 'Among the primary “facts" about pieces anti repertories of 
music (past and present) are their aesthetic qualities (past and present)’; lie saw 
the primary focus of musicology as ‘objects of delight’, Kerman, Musicology, pp. 
18, 32 (Kerman took the phrase "objects of delight’ from Arthur Mendel).
"■» Frankfurt. On Truth, p. 29. The facts are physical facts, in philosophical 
terminology, aesthetics facts supervene on physical facts. Using the example of 
sculpture, Jaegwon Kim explains the concept of supervenience thus: Imagine a 
sculptor working 011 a statue |...| When the physical work is finished, his work is 
finished; there is no further work o f ‘attaching’ desired aesthetic properties, say 
elegance and expressiveness, to the finished piece of stone. The aesthetic 
character of a sculpture is wholly fixed once the physical properties are fixed; 
that is, aesthetic properties supervene on physical properties. If a sculptor is 
unhappy with the aesthetic quality of his creation and wishes to improve it, he 
must get out his chisel and hammer and do more physical work on the stone; it 
is only by changing its physical character that its aesthetic character can tie 
improved or otherwise altered. Jaegwon Kim, ‘Supervenience, Emergence, 
Realization, Reduction’, in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, ed. by 
M ichael J. Loux and Dean W. Zim m erm an (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), p. 558 (Italics in original).
Applying this to m usic, w e can say that the aesthetic qualities o f a piece of music 
supervene on its sonic qualities.
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licence. So the significance of truth, and of the way things are, pervades 
musicology.
Conclusion
Musicologists are engaged in inquiry; it is a tautology that inquiry aims 
at the truth/'S It follows, as a matter of logic, that if she is to retain her 
scholarly status, the musicologist must be concerned with truth. 
Frankfurt makes explicit what a concern with truth would amount to in 
practice. It would mean:
finding satisfaction [...] in recognizing and in understanding significant 
truths that were previously unknown or obscure; being eager to 
protect, from  distortion or discredit, our appreciation o f those truths 
that we already possess; and, in general, being determined to 
encourage within society, insofar as we are able to do so, a vigorous 
and stable preference for true beliefs over ignorance, error, doubt, and 
m isrepresentation.66
The examples that I have described demonstrate, in the field of 
musicology, degrees of attention and inattention to the way things are, 
and how musicologists can care for truth. For Gibbs, attending to the 
reality of Schubert's life is a precarious venture at best, and the words 
he uses seem to suggest - although this may not be his intention - that a 
retreat from fact to fiction is permissible. By contrast, Shelemay is 
acutely aware of the way things are for the informants who contributed 
to her research, and how their situation might be affected by 
dissemination of her findings. The case of Eric Werner illustrates that 
sham and fake reasoning can infect scholarship, and how evidence for a 
thesis can be manipulated so that the relevant realities are ignored. 
Feld’s essay is the product of a scholar who, not paying undue deference 
to the limits implied by disciplinary boundaries, cares to comment on 
the global realities of the music business, and who is also critical of 
other scholars in his field for their myopia. The clash between Taruskin 
and Fink demonstrates how ideology and group-think may lead to a 
narrowing of vision with consequent ignoring of salient moral realities.
Introduction
65 Haack, M anifesto o f  a Passionate M oderate, p. 189.
66 Frankfurt, On Truth, pp. 96-97.
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The importance of truth for the musicologist can be placed in a 
wider context of the importance of truth for all individuals. Frankfurt 
points out that truth has a profound significance which goes much 
further than mere practical utility: each person’s sense of his own 
individuality can emerge only in the context of a real world, and 
recalcitrant truths about that world, independent of the self.6? These 
considerations provide an explanation for the claim made by Bernard 
Williams, in his last major work Truth and Truthfulness, that ‘to the 
extent that we lose a sense of the value of truth, we shall certainly lose 
something and may well lose everything’.68
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